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THE JURY REQUIREMENT IN DEATH SENTENCING AFTER
HURST V. FLORIDA
ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court has long held that the death penalty is different
from all other punishments and requires more substantive and procedural
restrictions. Capital sentencing in particular requires more protections
than non-capital sentencing. The Supreme Court has previously declared
that death cannot be the mandatory penalty for committing a criminal
offense. Instead after the conviction stage of a capital trial, states utilize a
second, sentencing stage in which the sentencer decides whether the de-
fendant receives a life sentence or the death penalty. States have devel-
oped several different kinds of sentencing schemes, most leaving sen-
tencing exclusively to the jury, others exclusively to the judge, and still
others a hybrid system wherein the jury gives a recommendation, but the
judge independently determines and imposes the actual sentence.
While the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punish-
ment controls most death penalty jurisprudence, the Sixth Amendment's
jury trial guarantee also limits the ways in which states may sentence a
defendant to death. The Supreme Court struck down judge-only sentenc-
ing systems in 2002, holding that these schemes violated criminal de-
fendants' jury trial right. Specifically, judge-only sentencing impermissi-
bly removed from the jury the duty of finding the aggravating factors
necessary to increase a criminal defendant's sentence from life impris-
onment to death. However, some of the states that allowed for the judi-
cial override of the jury's recommended sentence did not modify their
state death penalty statutes in the wake of this decision. Instead, they
argued that the jury's recommended sentence satisfied the Sixth
Amendment's jury trial guarantee, even though the judge determined the
actual sentence notwithstanding the jury's recommendation.
On January 12, 2016, the Supreme Court struck down Florida's hy-
brid sentencing statute. In Hurst v. Florida, the Court reiterated its previ-
ous sentencing jurisprudence, interpreting the Sixth Amendment as guar-
anteeing that a jury find all the facts necessary to elevate the possible
sentence from life imprisonment to death. Since this decision, the Dela-
ware and Alabama Supreme Courts have interpreted the Sixth Amend-
ment's requirements and have come to radically different conclusions
about their respective judicial-override systems. This Case Comment
analyzes the breadth and limitations of Hurst's Sixth Amendment ra-
tionale. The Court's Sixth Amendment jurisprudence limits the jury's
role in death sentencing to fact-finding. However, the evolving standards
of decency that lie at the heart of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on
cruel and unusual punishment make it impermissible for a single state
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actor to determine and impose the death penalty. Going forward, the
Court should recognize that the Eighth Amendment requires the jury,
representing and voicing the conscience of the community, to decide
every sentence of death.
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INTRODUCTION
On August 2, 2016, in Rauf v. State,' the Supreme Court of Dela-
ware ruled the state's death penalty statute unconstitutional.2 The
grounds for this ruling came from the recent United States Supreme
Court decision in Hurst v. Florida,3 which held that "[t]he Sixth
Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to find each fact necessary to
impose a sentence of death."A Delaware's capital sentencing statute cre-
ated a hybrid system in which the jury recommended a sentence of life
imprisonment or death, but the judge independently determined and im-
posed the sentence (also known as "judicial override"). The Delaware
Supreme Court justices who joined the majority split in their reasons,
each interpreting Hurst's requirements in radically different ways.6
1. 145 A.3d 430 (Del. 2016) (per curiam).
2. Id. at 433-35.
3. 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016). In Hurst, the Court applied the sentencing requirements revealed in
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), specifically to judicial-override capital sentencing. 136 S. Ct.
at 620-22.
4. Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 619.
5. See Rauf 145 A.3d at 450.
6. See id. at 434-37, 454, 458-61, 464-66, 468-69, 475-77, 480 (Strine, C.J., concurring);
id. at 482-87 (Holland, J., concurring); id. at 487-90, 492-501 (Valihura, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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Less than two months after Rauf, Alabama's Supreme Court held
that Hurst did not invalidate Alabama's own hybrid capital sentencing
system. Unanimous in the result and relying on earlier Alabama case
law, the state supreme court held that Alabama's construction of capital
crimes implicitly satisfied the Sixth Amendment's fact-finding require-
ments described in Hurst.
These varied opinions illustrate the general confusion surrounding
the U.S. Supreme Court's recent capital sentencing jurisprudence. This
Case Comment analyzes the breadth and limitations of Hurst's reliance
on the Sixth Amendment to define the jury's role in capital sentencing. It
argues that Hurst compels the conclusion that a jury, not a judge, must
make all death eligibility findings, including the assessment of the rela-
tive weight of aggravating and mitigating factors. In addition to this
Sixth Amendment guarantee, the Court should recognize the Eighth
Amendment as requiring the jury to determine and impose every death
sentence.
The Court's capital jurisprudence arose in the 1970s.9 In 1972's
Furman v. Georgia,'o the Supreme Court declared that the present appli-
cation of the death penalty violated the Constitution in a short per curiam
opinion joined by five justices." However, many states desired to retain
the death penalty and struggled to parse the Court's confusing decrees
and redraft their capital statutes accordingly.12
In response to Furman, every death penalty state adopted a bifurcat-
ed capital trial system, which divided trials into a guilt-innocence stage
and a sentencing stage.'3 The sentencing stage took several forms; while
7. See Bohannon v. State (In re Bohannon), No. 1150640, 2016 WL 5817692, at *17-18
(Ala. Sept. 30, 2016).
8. Id. at*10-ll, *15-17, *26.
9. See DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION: AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY IN AN AGE
OF ABOLITION 183-86 (2010) (discussing the American anti-death penalty movement that faltered in
the mid-1970s after the Supreme Court briefly ruled the death penalty unconstitutional); Sam Kamin
& Justin Marceau, The Facts About Ring v. Arizona and the Jury's Role in Capital Sentencing, 13
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 529, 533-35 (2011); Bryan A. Stevenson, The Ultimate Authority on the Ulti-
mate Punishment: The Requisite Role of the Jury in Capital Sentencing, 54 ALA. L. REV. 1091,
1091-93 (2003).
10. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
11. Id. at 239-40. Far from united in its reasoning, the five justices who voted down the death
penalty each issued his own concurrence. Id. at 240. Likewise, the four pro-death penalty justices
each authored his own dissent. Id.
12. See Jeffrey Abramson, Death-Is-Different Jurisprudence and the Role of the Capital Jury,
2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 117, 124-25 (2004); Malcolm E. Wheeler, Toward a Theory of Limited
Punishment II: The Eighth Amendment After Furman v. Georgia, 25 STAN. L. REV. 62, 62 (1972). In
what is perhaps an ironic nod to Furman, the Delaware Supreme Court in Rauffollowed Furman's
lead by issuing a short per curiam decision followed by several concurrences, leading to an outcome,
but no concrete rule of law. See Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d 430, 430-31 (Del. 2016) (per curiam)
("[T]he importance of [capital sentencing] to our state and our fellow citizens .. . makes it useful for
all the Justices to bring our various perspectives to bear on these difficult questions.").
13. See William J. Bowers et al., The Decision Maker Matters: An Empirical Examination of
the Way the Role of the Judge and the Jury Influence Death Penalty Decision-Making, 63 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 931, 932-33 (2006); cf Abramson, supra note 12, at 124-26.
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most states retained jury sentencing, some states instituted a system
wherein the judge alone determined sentencing factors, imposing a life
sentence or a death sentence based upon the judge's findings.14 Still oth-
ers employed hybrid systems (also known as judicial override) in which
the jury, having already convicted a criminal defendant of a capital of-
fense, recommended a sentence of life imprisonment or death, but the
judge independently determined and imposed the actual sentence.
The Supreme Court set a capital-sentencing trend in 1976 by up-
holding Florida's hybrid system.16 Over the 1980s and 1990s, the Court
routinely upheld hybrid and judge-only capital sentencing systems.,
However, in 1999 and 2000, the Court issued two non-capital sentencing
opinions that undermined these previously-constitutional capital sentenc-
18 20
ing systems. In Jones v. United States19 and Apprendi v. New Jersey,
the Court held that the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee requires
that any fact necessary to increase the maximum penalty for an offense is
an "element" of the offense and must be proved to a jury beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.2 1 This requirement applied to any such fact, no matter
what the state called it, and could not be avoided by describing the fact
as merely a sentencing consideration.22 While both opinions distin-
guished the seemingly-conflicting holdings of the earlier capital cases,23
the Court soon held in Ring v. Arizona24 that judge-only capital sentenc-
ing was "irreconcilable" with the Apprendi rule.25
While Ring determined the fate of judge-only capital sentencing,
states were left to wonder about the constitutionality of hybrid schemes.
Some abandoned the practice,26 but other states kept their systems in
14. Bowers et al., supra note 13, at 933.
15. Id. States implemented judicial override systems in order to protect defendants, thinking
that this gave defendants "a second chance for life with the trial judge" should the jury vote in favor
of the death penalty. See, e.g., Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 513 (1995) (quoting Dobbert v.
Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 296 (1977)).
16. See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 247-50, 253 (1976). In Florida's scheme, a jury,
after the conviction stage and a sentencing hearing, recommended a sentence of life imprisonment or
death; however, notwithstanding the jury's recommendation, a judge independently determined and
passed the sentence. Id. at 248-50, 252.
17. See, e.g., Harris, 513 U.S. at 515 (upholding Alabama's hybrid sentencing system); Wal-
ton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 639 (1990) (upholding Arizona's judge-only sentencing system),
overruled by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638, 638-41
(1989) (upholding Florida's hybrid system), overruled by Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016);
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 449 (1984) (upholding Florida's hybrid system), overruled by
Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).
18. See cases cited infra notes 19-20.
19. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
20. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
21. See id at 476, 490; Jones, 526 U.S. at 243-44.
22. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 495-96.
23. See id. at 496-97; Jones, 526 U.S. at 250-51.
24. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
25. See id. at 609.
26. See Bowers et al., supra note 13, at 937 (noting that Indiana replaced the judicial override
with jury-sentencing).
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place, relying on the Supreme Court's pre-Apprendi decisions upholding
these sentencing schemes.27 However, in the recent decision of Hurst, the
Court extended Apprendi and Ring, holding that Florida's hybrid sen-
tencing system denied criminal defendants their Sixth Amendment right
to a jury trial.2 8
Despite one Delaware Supreme Court justice's broad reading of
Hurst,29 this Case Comment will demonstrate that the Supreme Court's
recent extension of the Sixth Amendment is, at best, a modest step to-
ward guaranteeing that the death penalty be imposed without violating
constitutional safeguards. Part I explores the legal background leading up
to Hurst. Part II examines Hurst itself Part III discusses the implications
of Hurst. It first looks to the limits of Hurst by examining exactly what
kinds of facts fall under the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee. It
then looks to the Delaware Supreme Court's application and varied in-
terpretations of Hurst's mandates. The Case Comment then turns to
Hurst's implications, arguing that Alabama's judicial override statute
will almost certainly be overturned. Finally, it argues that the Hurst ma-
jority should have supported its Sixth Amendment holding with the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.30
These twin constitutional bulwarks limit the government's ability to sen-
tence and apply the death penalty.3 1 Taken together, they guarantee that a
judge-as the state's agent-can neither find the facts necessary to make
a defendant death eligible nor can a judge impose the ultimate penalty.
Rather, an impartial jury, as representative of the community's con-
science and voice, should make any findings necessary to sentence a
defendant to death.
I. BACKGROUND
In 1972, the Supreme Court ruled that the death penalty systems in
Texas and Georgia were so arbitrary that they violated the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.32 The deci-
27. See, e.g., Waldrop v. State (In re Waldrop), 859 So. 2d 1181, 1184, 1191 (Ala. 2002)
(upholding Alabama's hybrid system), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 968 (2003); Bottoson v. Moore, 833
So. 2d 693, 694-95 (Fla. 2002) (upholding Florida's hybrid system), abrogated by Hurst v. Florida,
136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).
28. Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 619-21, 624 (2016). The Court struck down Florida's
statute 7-1. See id
29. Raufv. State, 145 A.3d 430, 434-36 (Del. 2016) (Strine, C.J., concurring) (per curiam).
30. Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer provide the foundation for this argument. See Ring, 536
U.S. at 613-14 (Breyer, J., concurring); Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 515-16, 524-26 (1995)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 467, 471-73, 477-90 (1984) (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), overruled by Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).
31. Kamin & Marceau, supra note 9, at 532-33.
32. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (per curiam). The opinions of Jus-
tices Stewart, White, and Douglas-which were concerned with the states' formulation of the death
penalty and not the per se constitutionality of the death penalty-have had the largest influence on
death penalty jurisprudence going forward. While varied, the opinions criticized the lack of statutory
guidance for death sentencing and the randomness of death sentences. See Kamin & Marceau, supra
note 9, at 533-34.
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sion set the stage for modem death penalty jurisprudence as thirty-five
states scrambled to decipher the Court's requirements in Furman and
craft constitutionally permissible capital punishment statutes.33 While
this reworking took many forms, every death penalty state adopted a
bifurcated capital trial system, which split capital trials into two parts:
(1) the guilt-innocence stage (which must always be proven to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt) and (2) the sentencing stage.34 In 1976, the
Supreme Court issued five death penalty decisions in which it declared
that some states had overcome Furman's critiques.35 Effectively, the
death penalty was reinstated.
Over the years since restoring capital punishment, the Court has
evolved and adopted a "death-is-different" jurisprudence, primarily
linked to the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual pun-
ishment.36 This jurisprudence holds generally that because of its finality,
irrevocability, and severity, the death penalty requires "greater procedur-
al and substantive protections" than all other forms of punishment.37 For
example, in Woodson v. North Carolina,38 the Court held that, unlike
lesser punishments, the death penalty cannot be a mandatory punishment
for violation of a criminal statute.39
What makes a punishment cruel and unusual is not static but chang-
es as society progresses.40 Recognizing this principle, the Court derived
33. See Stevenson, supra note 9, at 1091 n.4. In the first stage, the Sixth Amendment required
that the defendant's guilt be proved to a jury by a reasonable doubt. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI ("In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed . . . .").
34. See Bowers et al., supra note 13, at 932-33; cf Abramson, supra note 12, at 124-26.
35. The Court upheld death penalty statutes in three cases. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262,
268, (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 247 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186-87,
206-07 (1976) (plurality opinion). The Court struck down statutes in two cases. See Roberts v.
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 327, 336 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 282, 305
(1976) (plurality opinion).
36. Abramson, supra note 12, at 118-19. Since 2002, the Court has generally expanded the
scope of the Eighth Amendment in terms of both capital punishment and life without the possibility
of parole (LWOP). See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012) (striking down man-
datory LWOP for juveniles); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 81-82 (2010) (striking down LWOP
for juveniles who commit non-homicide crimes); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 412-13
(2008) (striking down capital punishment for the rape of a child where the crime did not result and
was not intended to result in death of the victim); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578-79 (2005)
(striking down capital punishment for juveniles); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002)
(striking down capital punishment for intellectually disabled defendants).
37. Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional Sen-
tencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REv. 1145, 1150, 1164-65, 1167, 1174
(2009); see also Abramson, supra note 12, at 118-19; Erwin Chemerinsky, Sydney M. Irmas Profes-
sor of Pub. Interest Law, Legal Ethics & Political Sci., Univ. S. Cal. Law Sch., Keynote Address at
the Honorable James J. Gilvary Symposium on Law, Religion & Social Justice: Evolving Standards
of Decency in 2003-Is the Death Penalty on Life Support?, in 29 U. DAYTON L. REv. 201, 219
(2004) ("[D]eath, after all, is different than any other punishment because it's irrevocable. Any other
mistake could to some extent be corrected, but not when somebody is executed.").
38. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
39. Id. at 301.
40. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) ("[T]he words of the [Eighth] Amendment are
not precise, and . . . their scope is not static.").
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"two essential touchstones for defining the evolving standards of decen-
cy . .. at the core of Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishments: (1) 'objective ind[ices] of contemporary val-
ues"' seen in death penalty legislation and jury verdicts and (2) "whether
the death penalty 'comports with the basic concept of human dignity at
the core of the Amendment.'"4  Although the Court has mostly applied
the "evolving standards of decency" to limit substantive offenses (e.g.,
no capital punishment for non-homicide offenses and no capital punish-
ment for juveniles or those with intellectual disabilities),42 the Court has
indicated several times in the past that this standard applies to procedural
concerns as well (e.g., whether only a jury may pass the sentence of
death).4 3
Since 1976, states that did not leave capital sentencing determina-
tions exclusively to the jury adopted one of two systems. The first was a
judge-only sentencing scheme, in which a judge, sitting without a jury,
determined and imposed the sentence.4 The second was a hybrid
41. Stevenson, supra note 9, at 1139 (alteration in original) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 180-81 (1976) (plurality opinion)); accord William W. Berry Ill, Eighth Amendment
Differentness, 78 Mo. L. REV. 1053, 1060-61 (2013). In short, the objective indices boil down to
how many states (and perhaps other countries as well) use the form of punishment in question,
whether states (or other countries) expanded or reduced the practice over time, and how often the
punishment was imposed in the states (or countries) which employ them. See, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S.
at 312 ("[T]he clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation
enacted by the country's legislatures." (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh,.492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989), abro-
gated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002))); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584, 596 (1977) (Eighth Amendment evaluated by jury determinations and legislation). The second
part, the independent judgment of the Court, is evaluated "by asking whether there is reason to
disagree with the judgment reached by the citizenry and its legislators" when the objective indicia
show a general consensus. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313.
42. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2457-58 (2012) (striking down mandatory
LWOP for juveniles); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010) (striking down LWOP for juveniles
who commit non-homicide crimes); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 434-35 (2008) (striking
down capital punishment for non-homicide crimes); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570-71
(2005) (striking down capital punishment for juveniles); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (striking down
capital punishment for mentally intellectually disabled defendants); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.
782, 801 (1982) (striking down capital punishment for felony murder when defendant did not kill,
attempt to kill, or intend to kill the victim); see also Trop, 356 U.S. at 100-01 (Warren, C.J.) (using
the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society" for the first time,
holding that the Eighth Amendment does not allow denationalization as a form of punishment).
43. See Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 520-22 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing
the majority for not considering Alabama's judicial override under the evolving standards of decen-
cy set forth in Trop); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 464 (1984) (evaluating Florida's judicial
override statute in terms of "contemporary standards of [fairness and] decency"), overruled by Hurst
v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016); id. at 490 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("History, tradition, and the basic structure and purpose of the jury system persuade me that jury
sentencing is essential if the administration of capital punishment is to be governed by the communi-
ty's evolving standards of decency."); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (per curiam) (discussing the evolving standards of decency that govern the Eighth
Amendment and noting that "[it] would seem to be incontestable that he death penalty inflicted on
one defendant is 'unusual' if it discriminates against him by reason of his race, religion, wealth,
social position, or class, or if it is imposed under a procedure that gives room for the play of such
prejudices").
44. See Bowers et al., supra note 13, at 932-33, 933 n.9 (noting that this system was adopted
by Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, and Nebraska).
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scheme, in which a jury recommended a sentence, but the judge inde-
pendently made an assessment and imposed the sentence.45 In this hybrid
system, after finding a criminal defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt of a capital crime, a jury issued an advisory sentence by recom-
mending either a life sentence or the death penalty.46 However, the trial
judge, far from being bound by the jury's recommendation, could over-
ride the jury and impose the opposite sentence.47
In Proffitt v. Florida,4 8 the Court upheld hybrid sentencing on
Eighth Amendment grounds.49 With Eighth Amendment challenges no
longer available in the wake of Proffitt, criminal defendants turned to the
Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee to challenge non-jury death pen-
alty sentencing.so For the next quarter century, these challenges did not
move the Court. In both 1984 and 1989, the Court upheld Florida's
hybrid system, explaining that the Sixth Amendment did not require a
jury to impose a death sentence.52 In 1990, the Court also approved Ari-
zona's judge-only system.53 It held that during sentencing the Sixth
Amendment jury trial guarantee was not violated when a judge found the
facts necessary to impose a death sentence because these were "sentenc-
ing considerations" and not elements that must be proved to a jury be-
yond a reasonable doubt.54 This long period of Supreme Court approval
seemed to indicate that non-jury capital sentencing was constitutionally
permissible for the foreseeable future.
However, in 1999 and 2000, the Supreme Court issued two non-
capital sentencing opinions that laid the groundwork for a reversal of the
Court's previous Sixth Amendment decisions. The first of these decision
45. Id. at 932-33, 933 n.10 (noting that the judicial override was adopted by Alabama, Dela-
ware, Florida, and Indiana). Although the judicial override system started as a protection against
capital juries imposing unjust death sentences, judges in most hybrid states more often increase the
jury's sentence of life to death. See Stevenson, supra note 9, at 1140-45 (discussing the breakdown
of statistics on judicial overrides in hybrid states).
46. See Bowers et al., supra note 13, at 932-33.
47. See id. at 933.
48. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
49. Id. at 247. The Court lauded a judge's decision-making capabilities over a jury's, stating
that a trial judge's greater sentencing experience would "lead, if anything, to even greater consisten-
cy" in capital sentencing, helping to alleviate the randomness of the death penalty identified in
Furman. See id. at 252.
50. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 647-48 (1990), overruled by Ring v. Arizona, 536
U.S. 584 (2002); Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638, 638 (1989), overruled by Hurst v. Florida, 136 S.
Ct. 616 (2016); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984), overruled by Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct.
616 (2016).
51. See Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 515 (1995); Walton, 497 U.S. at 647-49; Hildwin,
490 U.S. at 640-41; Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 464-65. Justice Stevens dissented in both Harris and
Spaziano, arguing that the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment prohibited a
judge from imposing death by overriding a jury's life sentence. Harris, 513 U.S. at 526 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 490 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In
Ring, Justice Breyer, who supported the majority in Harris, changed his mind, opining that the
Eighth Amendment prohibits the judicial override. See infra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
52. Hildwin, 490 U.S. at 639-41; Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 464-65.
53. Walton, 497 U.S. at 648.
54. Id.
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adopted the eponymous Apprendi rule: "[A]ny fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."55 Crucially,
it did not matter how the State labeled the fact in question.5 6 Apprendi's
mandate focused on the effect of the sentencing scheme rather than its
form.57 States could not circumvent the Sixth Amendment through clever
statutory drafting by labeling these facts as "sentencing factors" or "sen-
tencing considerations."
When applied to capital sentencing, the Apprendi rule would seem
to prohibit a system in which the judge, at sentencing, has to find an ag-
gravating circumstance before a defendant is eligible for death.59 Confus-
ingly, in both Jones and Apprendi the Court went to great lengths to dis-
tinguish and harmonize the Apprendi rule with its previous capital sen-
tencing decisions, such as Spaziano v. Florida,a Hildwin v. Florida,6 1
and Walton v. Arizona,62 that permitted a judge to decide whether aggra-
vating factors were present.63
Two years later, the Supreme Court reversed itself in Ring.4 The
Court held "that the Constitution requires that at least some aspects of the
capital sentencing determination be allocated to a jury rather than a
judge."65 Overruling its decision in Walton, the Court held that the Ap-
prendi rule applied to capital sentencing.66 Specifically, Arizona's
scheme violated the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee because it
required a judge to determine the existence of an aggravating circum-
67stance without which the death penalty could not be imposed. As in
Apprendi, the Court determined that the Sixth Amendment does not care
how the statute labeled this crucial determination: "If a State makes an
increase in a defendant's authorized punishment contingent on the find-
55. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). The Rule was originally set forth in
Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 251-53 (1999). Apprendi concerned a New Jersey hate crime
statute in which a judge could find that a crime involved racial animus thus doubling the potential
maximum prison sentence. Kamin & Marceau, supra note 9, at 541-42.
56. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 495-96.
57. See id
58. See id. at 485.
59. See Kamin & Marceau, supra note 9, at 543.
60. 468 U.S. 447 (1984), overruled by Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).
61. 490 U.S. 638 (1989), overruled by Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).
62. 497 U.S. 639 (1990), overruled by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
63. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 496-97; Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 250-51 (1999).
Justice O'Connor described this attempted distinction as "baffling." Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 538
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
64. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002).
65. Stevenson, supra note 9, at 1094.
66. Id. at 1109.
67. Id. at 1109-10.
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ing of a fact, that fact-no matter how the State labels it-must be found
by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt."6 8
However, the State of Arizona argued in Ring that judicial death
sentencing was an important mechanism for ensuring that juries did not
arbitrarily or cruelly sentence defendants to death.69 On the one hand, the
Ring Court questioned the "superiority of judicial factfimding," while on
the other hand it reasoned that the Sixth Amendment jury trial guarantee
"does not turn on the relative rationality, fairness, or efficiency of poten-
tial factfiders."70 Instead, the Founders adopted the amendment because
they were not willing to allow the State to single-handedly carry out
criminal justice.7 '
A crucial development in Ring was that Justice Breyer changed his
mind about capital sentencing.72 Where in an earlier case, Harris v. Ala-
bama (Harris 1),73 he supported the majority's decision to uphold Ala-
bama's judicial override, in Ring he endorsed Justice Stevens's Harris I
74dissent. However, unlike the Ring majority, Justice Breyer did not ar-
gue for a limit based on the Sixth Amendment jury trial guarantee. Ra-
ther he argued for one based on the Eighth Amendment prohibition on
cruel and unusual punishment.75 The death penalty, he argued, had no
demonstrable deterrent or incapacitative effects above and beyond lesser
forms of punishment.76 Therefore, capital sentences found their primary
justification in retribution.7 7
Justice Breyer then highlighted the many controversies surrounding
the death penalty in general and with judicial imposition in particular:
(1) the political pressures on appointed and elected judges; (2) the large
divide in community opinion on whether the death penalty is ever justi-
fied; (3) the "potentially arbitrary application" of capital punishment;
(4) the fact that "the race of the victim and socio-economic factors seem
to matter"; (5) the potentially unconstitutional waits that death row pris-
oners endure before execution; (6) the poor legal representation that
many capital defendants receive; and (7) the United States' status as an
68. Ring, 536 U.S. at 602. Endorsing this point in his concurrence Justice Scalia quipped that
these facts were elements "whether the statute calls them elements of the offense, sentencing factors,
or Mary Jane." Id. at 610 (Scalia, J., concurring).
69. Id at 607 (Ginsburg, J.).
70. Id.
71. Id. ("[The jury-trial guarantee] has never been efficient; but it has always been free."
(quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 498 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring))).
72. Id. at 614 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("Wisdom too often never comes, and so one ought not
to reject it merely because it comes late." (quoting Henslee v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank & Tr. Co.,
335 U.S. 595, 600 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting))).
73. 513 U.S. 504 (1995).
74. Ring, 536 U.S. at 614-15 (Breyer, J., concurring).
75. Id. at 612-14.
76. Id. at 614-15.
77. Id. at 614.
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outlier on the world stage, being the "only Western industrialized Nation
that authorizes the death penalty."78
All of these controversies led Justice Breyer to determine that if the
United States should impose the death penalty then "the Eighth Amend-
ment requires individual jurors to make, and to take responsibility for,"
individual death sentences.79 The jury, as a cross-section of the commu-
nity, has access to the community's conscience and may speak with the
community's voice above and beyond appointed or elected judges.
80
The majority opinion in Ring, on the other hand, focused exclusive-
ly on judge-only sentencing schemes, necessarily invalidating the stat-
utes in other judge-only sentencing states. 8 In Ring's wake, hybrid states
struggled to decide how to respond.82 Some hybrid states chose to proac-
tively comply with Ring by replacing their questionable systems with
jury sentencing.83 Others chose to follow Ring in only the narrowest pos-
sible sense.4 Alabama and Florida, on the other hand, left their statutes
unchanged and their respective state courts later affirmed that their hy-
brid schemes either did not violate Ring or that Ring did not apply to
hybrid systems. This refusal to address Ring led to the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Hurst.86
II. HURST V. FLORIDA
A. Facts
In May of 1998, Cynthia Harrison was stabbed to death and left in
the freezer of the restaurant in which she worked. The restaurant's safe
was missing a large amount of money.88 Timothy Lee Hurst was the only
other person scheduled to work that night.89 He insisted that he never
78. Id. at 615-18.
79. Id. at 615-16, 618-19. Note that Justice Breyer's Eighth Amendment argument requires
much more than the Ring majority's Sixth Amendment mandate; instead of a jury making the fact-
finding determinations necessary for the imposition of a death sentence (allowing the judge to de-
termine and impose the sentence itself), the Eighth Amendment requires the jury to pass the actual
sentence of death. See id. at 618-19; see also Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 515-17, 519-20
(1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 467, 469, 470-72, 476-77, 482-
84, 486-88, 490 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), overruled by Hurst v.
Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).
80. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 615-16 (Breyer, J., concurring).
81. See Bowers et al., supra note 13, at 937.
82. See id at 937-38.
83. See id. (discussing how Indiana replaced the judicial override with a jury-sentencing
scheme).
84. See id. (discussing how Delaware changed its statute to require a jury to find at least one
aggravating circumstance but then left the finding of mitigating circumstances and the weighing of
the aggravating and mitigating circumstances as well as the imposition of the sentence to a judge).
85. Waldrop v. State (In re Waldrop), 859 So. 2d 1181, 1187-90 (Ala. 2002); Bottoson v.
Moore, 833 So. 2d 693, 695 (Fla. 2002), abrogated by Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).
86. Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 620-21 (2016).





made it in, but called Harrison to report that his car had broken down.
During his phone call with Harrison, Hurst claimed that she seemed
scared and that he had heard someone else "whispering in the back-
ground.""
B. Procedural History
The State of Florida charged Timothy Lee Hurst, the only other res-
taurant employee scheduled to work that night, with murder.91 The State
put on "substantial forensic evidence" and numerous witnesses who testi-
92fied to Hurst's culpability. The jury found Hurst guilty of first degree
murder without explaining upon which theory-premeditated murder or
felony murder-it made its finding. 93
The trial court then held a sentencing hearing in which the jury rec-
ommended the death penalty.94 The judge agreed and sentenced Hurst to
death.95 However, the Florida Supreme Court vacated the sentence "for
reasons not relevant to this case."96
After a new sentencing hearing, the jury again recommended the
death penalty.9 7 Having given "great weight" to the jury's recommenda-
tion, the judge independently found that "both the heinous-murder and
robbery aggravators existed" and sentenced Hurst to death.98
Hurst challenged his sentence as a violation of his Sixth Amend-
ment right to a jury trial in light of the Court's decision in Ring.99 Alt-
hough recognizing that Ring "held that capital defendants are entitled to
a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an
increase in the maximum punishment," Florida's highest court rejected
Hurst's argument in a four-to-three decision.'00 The Florida court stated
that Ring was "inapplicable" because the Supreme Court of the United
States had repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of Florida's sentencing
scheme over the past twenty-five years.0 1 The Supreme Court then




93. Id. at 619-20.
94. Id. Florida's death penalty statute bifurcates capital trials into a guilt-innocence stage and
a sentencing stage. See Bowers et al., supra note 13, at 937-39.
95. Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 619-20.
96. Id. at 620.
97. Id. (noting that the jury voted 7-5 for death).
98. Id
99. Id
100. Id at 620-21 (quoting Hurst v. State, 147 So. 3d 435, 445-46 (Fla. 2014), abrogated by
Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016)).
101. Id. at 620.
102. Id. at 621.
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C. Opinion of the Court
Justice Sotomayor delivered the majority opinion joined by six oth-
er justices.103 The Court held that Florida's sentencing scheme was un-
constitutional in light of Apprendi and Ring.' 0 It found that Florida's
capital sentencing system required a judge, independent of a jury, to find
aggravating factors before sentencing a defendant to death. os Because a
criminal defendant could not receive a death sentence absent this finding,
the Apprendi rule required this determination to be made by a jury be-
cause "[a] jury's mere recommendation is not enough."106
Justice Sotomayor then acknowledged and rejected three arguments
made by Florida in defense of the statute.107 First, the State argued that
the jury's recommendation of a death sentence "necessarily included a
finding of an aggravating circumstance"; the judge's finding at the sen-
tencing stage then was a redundant safeguard, not a necessary step before
a death sentence could be passed.08 The Court rejected this argument,
highli hting that the State fundamentally mischaracterized the judge's
role.'o Without a judge's independent finding of an aggravating circum-
stance at sentencing, Florida's law did not allow for a death sentence."0
Second, the State argued that Hurst admitted to an aggravating cir-
cumstance and that Ring "[did] not require jury findings on facts defend-
ants have admitted.""' The Court, however, determined that Florida had
misapplied precedent and that Hurst, in fact, had admitted no such
thing.112 Lastly, the State argued that the Court's decisions in Spaziano
and Hildwin settled the issue in Florida's favor, having twice ruled the
state's system constitutional.'13 The Court responded by overruling the
earlier cases, finding them "irreconcilable with Apprendi.""14 However,
rather than vacating Hurst's sentence, the Court remanded the case to
determine whether or not this error was harmless."5
103. See id. at 619, 624.
104. See id at 619 ("The Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to find each fact nec-
essary to impose a sentence of death.").
105. Id. at 624.
106. Id. at 619.
107. Id. at 622-24.
108. Id at 622 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 44, Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016)
(No. 14-7505), 2015 WL 4607695, at *44).
109. Id. (noting that Florida's statute required "[tlhe trial court alone" to find the facts neces-
sary to impose the death penalty).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 622-23 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 41, Hurst, 136 S. Ct. 616 (No. 14-7505),
2015 WL 4607695, at *41).
112. Id. (explaining that Florida relied on a case concerning guilty pleas not jury findings).
113. Id. at 623.
114. Id at 623-24 (finding support in Ring's earlier overruling of Walton).
115. Id. at 624 (avoiding the question of whether the error was harmless or not and stating that
this is a determination usually left to state courts). Florida judges have not overridden the jury's
recommendation of life imprisonment since 1999. See Michael L. Radelet, Overriding Jury Sentenc-
ing Recommendations in Florida Capital Cases: An Update and Possible Half-Requiem, 2011
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D. Justice Breyer's Opinion Concurring in the Judgment
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Breyer reasoned that the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment requires that
a jury, not a judge, impose a sentence of death.116 Justice Breyer used his
concurrence in Ring to explain his reasoning.1 17 As a retributive form of
punishment with minimal, if any, penal benefit over life imprisonment,
Justice Breyer would have held that the death penalty is only permissible
when a jury, acting as the conscience and voice of its community, deter-
mines and passes the sentence."8
E. Justice Alito's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Alito alone dissented.'19 He began by analyzing the Court's
approval of Florida's sentencing system over the past twenty-five
years.120 Further, he opined that rather than overruling Spaziano and
Hildwin, the Court should reexamine Ring.121
Justice Alito then wrote that even if Ring was correct, the Court
erred in extending it to Florida's sentencing system.122 He found crucial
differences between Arizona's judge-only sentencing scheme in Ring and
Florida's hybrid system in Hurst.123 Unlike Arizona's completely jury-
free system, Florida required a capital jury to be "the initial and primary
adjudicator of the factors bearing on the death penalty."1 24 Juries heard
evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, weighed these
circumstances against each other, and recommended death only if the
State proved beyond a reasonable doubt one or more aggravating circum-
stances.125 Justice Alito endorsed the State's argument that the judge then
merely duplicated the steps taken by the jury.12 6
Finally, in the alternative, Justice Alito asserted that the error in
Hurst's case was harmless.127 The State, he concluded, proved with
"overwhelming" evidence both the robbery-aggravator and the heinous-
MICH. ST. L. REV. 793, 809-10 (2011). "Between 1972 and early June 2011, a total of 166 death
sentences were imposed in Florida following a jury recommendation. . . . [O]nly about twenty-six
percent (43 + 166) of the override cases were affirmed on direct appeal. Of those forty-three, thirty-
four won relief (so far) after subsequent litigation. Five remain on death row, and four were execut-
ed." Id. at 809 (footnotes omitted).
116. Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 624 (Breyer, J., concurring).
117. Id.
118. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 614-17 (2002).
119. Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 624-27 (Alito, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 624-25.
121. Id. at 625 (referencing his dissent in Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2172-73
(2013) (Alito, J., dissenting)).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 625-26.
124. Id. at 625.
125. Id.
126. See id. at 625-26 (highlighting that a judge has not overridden the jury to impose death in
over fifteen years as support for judicial fact-finding functioning as a mere redundancy).
127. Id. at 626.
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ness-aggravator which made Hurst eligible for the death penalty.128 To
Justice Alito, "it defies belief to suggest that the jury would not have
found the existence of either aggravating factor if its finding was bind-
ing."l29
III. ANALYSIS
In Hurst, the Supreme Court made a straightforward application of
the Apprendi-Ring requirements to Florida's hybrid sentencing
scheme.130 By doing so, the Court has taken another modest step toward
securing Sixth Amendment protections for capital defendants. However,
the narrowness of the Ring and Hurst holdings might signal a moderation
of the sweeping sentencing reforms of Jones and Apprendi. While the
Court has recognized that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant
the right to have a jury find the facts necessary to make him or her eligi-
ble for death, the Court, aside from Justice Breyer, seems reluctant to
declare that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the
right to have a jury pass the death sentence itself.
This Part first analyzes the breadth and limitations of the Hurst de-
cision: what kinds of facts at sentencing, in addition to aggravating fac-
tors, are "elements" for the purposes of complying with the Sixth
Amendment after Apprendi, Ring, and Hurst? It then examines the Del-
aware Supreme Court's application of Hurst in Rauf and the justices'
competing interpretations of what Hurst requires for capital sentencing.
This Part next examines the constitutionality of certain state death
penalty statutes in light of these decisions, determining that Alabama's
statute, at the very least, must be overturned. Finally, it looks to Justice
Breyer's and Justice Stevens's calls for an Eighth Amendment right to
have a jury determine, impose, and take responsibility for each particular
sentence of death. The death penalty requires the most stringent of pro-
tections because of its severity and irrevocability. The Court should rec-
ognize that the Sixth and Eighth Amendments bar judges, as state offi-
cials, from imposing the death penalty. Instead, a jury, representing and
expressing the community's conscience, when aided by proper statutory
guidelines, should determine and impose death sentences.
A. The Limits ofHurst: What Kinds ofFacts Are Elements?
The Ring and Hurst holdings limit the manner in which a state may
sentence criminal defendants to death.1' However, these rulings are
quite narrow. The Apprendi rule mandates that "any fact that increases
128. Id.
129. Id. However, the jury only recommended death by seven votes to five. Id. at 620 (So-
tomayor, J.).
130. Id at 620-24.
131. Id. at 624; Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002).
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the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum" has to
be found by a jury.1 32 These facts, according to the rule, are actually "el-
ements" of the crime regardless of whether the legislature classifies them
in statutory drafting as "sentencing factors" or "sentencing condi-
tions."l33 By relying exclusively on the Apprendi rule, the Court has held
that the Sixth Amendment guarantees only that the jury make all fact-
finding determinations necessary for death penalty eligibility rather than
guaranteeing a jury determine and impose a sentence of death itself.134
The effects of Ring and Hurst depend on what exactly a "fact" is with
regard to capital sentencing. In Ring and Hurst, the Court clarified that at
least one kind of fact is subject to Apprendi: the existence (or absence) of
an aggravating circumstance-an issue addressed during the sentencing
stage of a capital trial-is a fact for the purposes of the Sixth Amend-
ment because it is a necessary finding before a defendant can become
eligible for a death sentence. 135
However, death sentences are not imposed based on aggravating
circumstances alone.1 36 Instead, there are two other requirements: (1) the
consideration of mitigating circumstances and (2) the weighing of the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances against one another and the
determination that the aggravating outweigh the mitigating.137
These requirements are not just statutory mandates imposed by state
legislatures.13 8 Rather, the Court has held that the Eighth Amendment
requires that the sentencing body in a capital case-whether judge or
jury-considers mitigating factors before it passes a sentence and that a
state may not limit the kinds of mitigating factors that the sentencer may
132. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S 466, 490 (2000).
133. Id. at 494 ("[T]he relevant inquiry is not one of form, but of effect-does the required
finding expose the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury's guilty ver-
dict?").
134. Kamin & Marceau, supra note 9, at 529-30.
135. See Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 619; Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 588-89 (2002).
136. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47(d)-(e) (1975) (describing how the trial court must "enter
specific written findings" for (1) aggravating circumstances, (2) mitigating circumstances, and then
(3) "determine whether the aggravating circumstances it finds to exist outweigh the mitigating cir-
cumstances it finds to exist").
137. See Kamin & Marceau, supra note 9, at 548-50 ("[States] generally ask triers of fact to
consider any proffered mitigating evidence against he government's case in aggravation and to
determine whether, on balance, the evidence supports a punishment of life imprisonment or death.").
This is a necessary simplification of how states have structured their capital sentencing statutes. In
practice, states statutes often look different than the three-step process. For example, Texas has a
two-step process. In the first step, the jury must determine whether the defendant poses a future
danger (the aggravating factor). In the second-step, the jury must determine whether "taking into
consideration all of the evidence, including the circumstances of the offense, the defendant's charac-
ter and background, and the personal moral culpability of the defendant, there is a sufficient mitigat-
ing circumstance or circumstances to warrant" a life sentence. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
37.071, § 2(a)(1), (b)(1)-(2), (e)(1) (West 2013). Thus far, the Supreme Court has not recognized
any particular constitutional limitations for how the weighing process must occur. See Kansas v.
Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 175 (2006); Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 179 (1988); see also Kamin &
Marceau, supra note 9, at 550.
138. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(d)(1) (2013) (Delaware's death sentencing
statute), held unconstitutional by Raufv. State, 145 A.3d 430 (Del. 2016) (per curiam).
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consider as grounds for leniency.139 Crucially, mere consideration of
mitigating factors is not enough; instead, the Constitution requires the
sentencing body to be able to act on these factors. 4 The Court went on
to declare that "[o]nly then can we be sure that the sentencer has treated
the defendant as a 'uniquely individual human bein[g]' and has made a
reliable determination that death is the appropriate sentence."41
Some states have narrowly interpreted Ring and Hurst, arguing that
the jury need not make all three of these determinations to meet the Sixth
Amendment's requirements.142 According to this interpretation, when a
jury first finds an aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt, the de-
fendant becomes death eligible; any mitigation at this point is not an el-
ement under Apprendi (anything necessary to increase the maximum
punishment) but, rather, an opportunity to lessen an already available
punishment.143 For instance, in Texas, a defendant cannot be given the
death penalty unless a jury finds the existence of a single kind of aggra-
vating circumstance (future dangerousness), but after this finding, the
judge determines the existence or absence of mitigating factors, weighs
the aggravating factors against the mitigating factors, and ultimately de-
cides to impose the death penalty or not.'
Ring and Hurst leave defendants and legislators unsure whether the-
se two types of findings function as "elements" of the crime by being
necessary facts that must be found before imposition of a death sentence
(like the finding of aggravating circumstances).145 The Supreme Court
could decide that these findings are not elements. Instead, it might hold,
as the highest criminal court in Texas has ruled,14 that the finding of an
aggravating circumstance alone lifts the possible sentence from life to
death. These secondary findings then function as true sentencing factors.
Under this interpretation, these findings are not necessary for a particular
139. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978) (invalidating an Ohio statute that limited
the kinds of mitigating factors the sentencer could consider as a basis for granting life over death);
see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1982) ("Just as the State may not by statute
preclude the sentencer from considering any mitigating factor, neither may the sentencer refuse to
consider, as a matter oflaw, any relevant mitigating evidence.").
140. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). The jury's consideration of mitigating factors may be guided by state
statutes in capital cases but never removed. See Marsh, 548 U.S. at 171 ("So long as the sentencer is
not precluded from considering relevant mitigating evidence, a capital sentencing statute cannot be
said to impermissibly, much less automatically, impose death.").
141. Penry, 492 U.S. at 319 (alteration in original) (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280, 304-05 (1976) (plurality opinion)).
142. See, e.g., Perry v. State, 158 S.W.3d 438, 447-48 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (arguing that
Texas's sentencing scheme did not run afoul of Ring).
143. Id.
144. See Kamin & Marceau, supra note 9, at 568-69. Before Rauf Delaware had a similar
system in which a jury found "at least one statutory aggravating factor" before a judge weighed the
aggravating and the mitigating and decided the sentence. Bowers et al., supra note 13, at 937.
145. See Bowers et al., supra note 13, at 945-46 (discussing the confusion over whether Ring
demands that jurors find and weigh mitigating factors).
146. Perry, 158 S.W.3d at 447-49.
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defendant's eligibility for death and do not increase the sentence availa-
ble prior to their evaluation by the judge, but merely affect the sentenc-
ing outcome.14 7 The Eastern District Court of Missouri recently interpret-
ed Ring and Hurst in just this way. 148
Before 2013, there was some reason to believe that the Court would
adopt this reasoning and hold that these two findings are not subject to
the Apprendi rule.149 In Harris v. United States (Harris II),15o which fol-
lowed shortly on the heels of Ring, the Court limited Apprendi, holding
that the Sixth Amendment did not require a jury to make fact-finding
determinations which trigger a mandatory minimum sentence.is' In 2013,
however, the Court expressly rejected and overruled Harris II in Alleyne
v. United States.'52 In Alleyne the Court held that "any fact that increases
the mandatory minimum is an 'element' that must be submitted to the
jury."
1 53
Although the Alleyne ruling suggests that the Court might reject
such rigid formalisms, it is not dispositive. The Alleyne decision made
clear that Apprendi should not be read as cutting off the United States'
long history of judicial discretion in sentencing.154 The Court may well
decide that mitigating circumstances and the weighing of those circum-
stances against the aggravating are truly sentencing factors, not elements.
This interpretation would hold these are the kinds of facts that a judge or
jury can and should consider to decide between a sentence of life or
death once the finding of an aggravating factor by the jury has made the
defendant death eligible. In their analysis of the fact-driven requirements
of Ring, Professors Sam Kamin and Justin Marceau have argued that
states can circumvent such an interpretation of Ring "by dispensing with
any legalistic limits on the process of balancing, by making it look more
like a moral judgment and less like a legal one." 55
However, this position would undermine the last sixteen years of
sentencing jurisprudence, as it supports the kind of formalism that the
Court sought to remove from criminal sentencing with the Apprendi
147. See Bowers et al., supra note 13, at 945-46.
148. See McLaughlin v. Steele, No. 4:12CV1464 CDP, 2016 WL 1106884, at *29-30 (E.D.
Mo. Mar. 22, 2016). In McLaughlin, the court decided that Ring and Hurst did not, of themselves,
make the finding of mitigating circumstances and the weighing of the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances fact findings necessary to impose the death penalty. However, it still vacated the
defendant's death sentence because it found that the Missouri statute of its own power made such
findings "facts." Id.
149. See Abramson, supra note 12, at 154 (discussing whether the Court will apply the logic of
Harris to mitigating factors).
150. 536 U.S. 545 (2002), overruled by Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013).
151. Id. at 555-57 (holding that it is constitutionally permissible for a judge to make this de-
termination because it imposed a minimum penalty permitted under the statute, rather than increas-
ing the ceiling of permitted punishment).
152. 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2155 (2013).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 2163.
155. See Kamin & Marceau, supra note 9, at 572.
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rule.156 Under this interpretation, a state, like Missouri in McLaughlin v.
Steele,15 7 can sidestep the Sixth Amendment by merely characterizing
mitigating circumstances as "sentencing factors" notwithstanding Ap-
prendi's disapproval of such tactics. Under this interpretation, Texas's
hybrid system, in which a jury need only find an aggravating circum-
stance and the judge then determines the sentence, would withstand Sixth
Amendment scrutiny.
The determination of aggravating factors is an obvious example of
fact-finding. Aggravating factors can be enumerated in a statute and the
jury can simply decide that the evidence shows the defendant did or did
not do X (e.g., intentionally murder for pecuniary gain).159 On the other
hand, the consideration of mitigating factors and then weighing them
against the aggravating factors is not as obvious an example of fact-
finding.'6 Nonetheless, fact-finding determinations have never been
limited to such obvious examples. For instance, the Supreme Court has
long held that the finding of negligence in tort cases is a question of
fact.161 The legal system treats negligence as a factual determination in
large part because juries determine negligence by means of a balancing
test.162 Justice Scalia, in dicta mere days after Hurst was decided, reiter-
ated that the process of finding and weighing of mitigating circumstances
contained fact-finding determinations even though they were in large
part "question[s] of mercy." 63
156. See id at 569-71 ("The jury right cannot be evaded by simply redefining critical elements
as defenses or sentencing factors . . . .").
157. See McLaughlin v. Steele, No. 4:12CVl464 CDP, 2016 WL 1106884, *26-28 (E.D. Mo.
Mar. 22, 2016).
158. See Perry v. State, 158 S.W.3d 438, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
159. See FLA. STAT. § 921.141(6) (2016) (enumerating a finite list of aggravating factors of
Florida's capital punishment statute), held unconstitutional by Perry v. State, No. SC 16-547, 2016
WL 6036982 (Fla. Oct. 14, 2016) (per curiam); cf id. § 921.141(7) (enumerating a list of mitigating
circumstances, but with "[t]he existence of any other factors in the defendant's background that
would mitigate against imposition of the death penalty"); see also Kansas v. Carr, 136 S. Ct. 633,
642 (2016) (in dicta) (discussing how the finding of aggravating circumstances "is a purely factual
determination").
160. Others have argued that the Supreme Court's Sixth Amendment jurisprudence allows
states to exclude the jury from these crucial sentencing decisions "by making [them] open-ended
rather than fact-based, by making the decision to impose death a moral judgment rather than a legal
conclusion." Kamin & Marceau, supra note 9, at 530.
161. Sioux City & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657, 664 (1873) ("[A]lthough the
facts [in this case] are undisputed it is for the jury and not for the judge to determine whether proper
care was given, or whether they establish negligence."); see also Ronald J. Allen & Michael S.
Pardo, The Myth ofthe Law-Fact Distinction, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1769, 1781 (2003) ("[I]t is a firmly
entrenched rule that juries shall decide both the underlying facts and whether those facts constitute
negligence.").
162. See Thomas v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 288 F.3d 305, 307-08 (7th Cir. 2002)
(Posner, J.) (citing Judge Learned Hand's famous balancing test for negligence in United States v.
Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) ("[T]he owner's duty... to provide against
resulting injuries is a function of three variables: (1) The probability that [a ship] will break away
[from its mooring]; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury, if she does; (3) the burden of adequate
precautions.")).
163. See Carr, 136 S. Ct. at 642 (Although Justice Scalia drew a distinction between aggravat-
ing and mitigating circumstances, he explicitly stated that this argument did not "reference . .. our
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A better ruling would hold that the determination of mitigating fac-
tors and the process of weighing aggravating factors against mitigating
factors constitutes an element of the offense for the purposes of Appren-
di, Ring, and Hurst.1 6 While Ring and Hurst mandate that a jury find
aggravating factors necessary to make death eligible, the Supreme Court
has already held that it is unconstitutional to sentence someone to death
without considering mitigating evidence and without weighing that evi-
dence against the aggravating factors.1 65
The consideration and weighing of mitigating factors are elements
of a capital crime under the Apprendi rule because without such consid-
eration and without making a fact-finding determination in how much
weight to assign those factors, a sentencer cannot pass a sentence of
death. '6 Stated another way, the existence of an aggravating factor alone
does not make a defendant eligible for death. Without considering miti-
gating evidence and without weighing that evidence against the aggravat-
ing circumstances, a sentencer cannot impose the death penalty.'67 To
treat a defendant as death-eligible once the jury has found an aggravating
factor-a necessary premise of the narrow reading of Ring and Hurst-is
flatly inconsistent with the Court's insistence that the death penalty is
only constitutionally permissible once mitigating factors have been con-
sidered and weighed.168 Therefore, the narrow interpretation of Ring and
Hurst cannot be squared with the Court's existing death penalty prece-
dents.
This interpretation forms the basis of much of the Delaware Su-
preme Court's rationale in Rauf for striking down the State's capital pun-
capital-sentencing case law"); see also id. at 648 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (discussing the majori-
ty's fact-judgment contained in the weighing of mitigation).
164. See Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d 430, 474 (Del. 2016) (Strine, C.J., concurring) (per curiam)
("[I]t is not clear what constitutional line exists involving facts that aggravate toward greater pun-
ishment or those that mitigate toward leniency. These are both key factual components. . . . [A]
consideration of the mitigating factors is every bit as crucial-as necessary-to the determination of
life or death."). This comment makes no argument as to mitigating factors and the weighing of
aggravation against mitigation as part of the Eighth Amendment's narrowing principle. For a de-
tailed discussion of this principle, see Sam Kamin & Justin Marceau, Waking the Furman Giant, 48
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 981 (2015).
165. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1982) (court may not preclude sentencing
body from considering mitigating evidence as a matter of law); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 607-
08 (1978) (legislature may not limit relevant mitigation in statute); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 271
(1976) (state may not limit mitigating evidence).
166. See Eddings, 455 U.S. at 113-14; Lockett, 438 U.S. at 608; Jurek, 428 U.S. at 271; see
also Rauf, 145 A.3d at 474 (Strine, C.J., concurring) ("[T]he fact finding necessary to sentence a
defendant to death cannot avoid a consideration of mitigating factors too."). In Jurek, the Supreme
Court explicitly stated that a system that did not allow the consideration of mitigating factors in
determining death sentences came perilously close to mandatory capital punishment statutes which
the Court held to be unconstitutional. 428 U.S. at 271 ("A jury must be allowed to consider on the
basis of all relevant evidence not only why a death sentence should be imposed, but also why it
should not be imposed.").
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ishment statute in early August.169 It also strongly suggests that all three
sentencing considerations are elements of the offense, no matter what a
state legislature names them.170 Rather than withdrawing from Apprendi,
this interpretation embraces the spirit of the Apprendi rule: "When a
judge's finding based on a mere preponderance of the evidence authoriz-
es an increase in the maximum punishment, it is appropriately character-
ized as 'a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense.""n7
B. Delaware's Unconstitutional Death Penalty Statute: Rauf v. State
Seven months after Hurst, the Supreme Court of Delaware struck
down the state's death penalty statute.172 The court issued a short per
curiam opinion joined by three justices, holding the statute unconstitu-
tional because it, among other things, allowed a judge to determine ag-
gravating factors and weigh the aggravating factors against the mitigat-
ing.1 73 Finding that the statute rendered the "respective roles of the judge
and jury . . . so complicated," the court held that they could not sever the
sentencing provisions from the statute as a whole and struck down the
entire death penalty statute.174 Rather than presenting unified reasons for
these holdings, the court's justices split, authoring three concurrences
with separate legal arguments.175
Chief Justice Strine's concurrence presents the most far-reaching in-
terpretation of Hurst.16 He recognizes that the Supreme Court has previ-
ously held that consideration of mitigation, along with balancing of miti-
gation against aggravating circumstances, is "necessary to sentence a
defendant to death." 77 However, his analysis does not end there. He fur-
ther argues that, "[r]ather than write more and more intricate judicial
decisions parsing different kinds of fact findings," Hurst restores the
historical role of the jury in death sentencing: "200 years of our nation's
customs and traditions" reveal that the jury has typically passed death
169. See discussion supra Section HI.A.
170. See Rauf, 145 A.3d at 474 (Strine, C.J., concurring).
171. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 495 (2000) (quoting McMillan v. Pennsylva-
nia, 477 U.S. 79, 88 (1986)); see also Woodward, 134 S. Ct. at 410-11 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (describing the weighing of aggravating factors against mitigating factors
as a "factual finding [that] exposes the defendant to a greater punishment than he would otherwise
receive: death, as opposed to life without parole").
172. Rauf 145 A.3d at 432-33 (Strine, C.J., Holland, J. & Seitz, J.). Delaware's Attorney
General has decided not to pursue an appeal to the United States Supreme Court. Attorney General
Will Not Appeal to U.S. Supreme Court on Death Penalty, DELAWARE.GOV (Aug. 15, 2016),
http://news.delaware.gov/2016/08/15/cp/.
173. Rauf 145 A.3d at 432-33 (Strine, C.J., Holland, J. & Seitz, J.). Delaware's statute, like
Florida's, had the jury give a recommendation after finding aggravators, mitigators, and weighing,
but the judge's determination decided the ultimate sentence. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(d)(1)
(2013), held unconstitutional by Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d 430 (Del. 2016) (per curiam).
174. Rauf 145 A.3d at 433 (Strine, C.J., Holland, J. & Seitz, J.).
175. See id (Strine, C.J., concurring); id at 482 (Holland, J., concurring); id. at 487 (Valihura,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
176. See id. at 434-36 (Strine, C.J., concurring).
177. Id. at 451.
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sentences. Ultimately, Chief Justice Strine concludes that the Sixth
Amendment requires a jury to be the final sentencing body in capital
cases, arguing "[i]f the right to a jury means anything, it means the right
to have a jury drawn from the community and acting as a proxy for its
diverse views and mores, rather than one judge, make the awful decision
whether the defendant should live or die."l7 9
Justice Holland, by contrast, restricts his argument to a straightfor-
ward extension of Hurst.'80 He argues that the language of Ring and
Hurst differ just enough for Hurst to do something new: require the jury,
not a judge, to weigh the aggravating factors against the mitigating. 18 He
finds support for this reading in Justice Sotomayor's authorship of the
majority opinion in Hurst.1 82 Three years before Hurst, Justice So-
tomayor dissented from a denial of certiorari in Woodward v. Ala-
bama,183 arguing:
[A] defendant is eligible for the death penalty in Alabama only upon
a specific factual finding that any aggravating factors outweigh the
mitigating factors he has presented. The statutorily required finding
that the aggravating factors of a defendant's crime outweigh the miti-
gating factors is therefore necessary to impose the death penalty. It is
clear, then, that this factual finding exposes the defendant to a greater
punishment than he would otherwise receive: death, as opposed to
life without parole. Under Apprendi and Ring, a finding that has such
an effect must be made by a jury.18
According to Justice Holland, Justice Sotomayor intentionally
placed new, broader language into the Hurst majority opinion. Specifi-
cally, by inserting the sentence, "[t]he Sixth Amendment requires a jury,
not a judge, to find each fact necessary to impose a sentence of death,"
Justice Sotomayor expanded Ring to include the process of weighing
mitigation and aggravation because this too is a necessary fact-finding
before a sentencer can pass a death sentence.186
Justice Valihura, unlike Chief Justice Strine and Justice Holland,
argues that, while Hurst does require a jury to find aggravating circum-
stances, it does not similarly require a jury to consider and weigh miti-
gating circumstances against aggravating circumstances before the impo-
178. Id. at 477.
179. Id. at 436.
180. See id at 482-87 (Holland, J., concurring).
181. Id at 487 ("Although the United States Supreme Court's holding in Hurst only specifical-
ly invalidated a judicial determination of aggravating circumstances, it also stated unequivocally that
the jury trial right recognized in Ring now applies to all factual findings necessary to impose a death
sentence under a state statute.").
182. Id.
183. 134 S. Ct. 405 (2013).
184. Id at 410-11 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (citation omitted).
185. See Rauf 145 A.3d at 482 (Holland, J., concurring).
186. See id (quoting Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 619 (2016) (emphasis added)).
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sition of death.87 Justice Valihura also makes use of Justice Sotomayor's
authorship of Hurst and the dissent in Woodward, but reaches a different
conclusion-namely that if Justice Sotomayor wished to extend Appren-
di-Ring to the process of weighing aggravating circumstances against
mitigating circumstances, then she would have explicitly done so, rather
than sneaking it in through the back door.'88 Instead, weighing is a "judi-
cial function" both constitutionally and under Delaware's own statute.89
C. State Implications ofHurst: What Happens Next?
Where the Supreme Court of Delaware held that Hurst invalidated
its capital sentencing statute, the Supreme Court of Alabama found no
such problem for its state's system. After Ring, the Alabama legisla-
ture refused to change its judicial override system, and the state's highest
court ruled that Ring was inapplicable because of the structure of the
state death penalty statute.191 After Hurst, the Alabama Supreme Court
relied on this interpretation, reasoning that Hurst was a mere application
of Ring rather than an extension.'92 The court held that, because Hurst
did not reveal any new constitutional requirements, Alabama's statute
remained constitutional.'93
Alabama's hybrid system largely mirrors the one that the Supreme
Court struck down in Hurst.194 However, there are two main differences
between Florida and Alabama's statutes: one in the sentencing scheme
itself and the other in the statutory division of capital offenses.
These sentencing differences make Alabama's system an even more
egregious violation of the Sixth Amendment than Florida's. The Court
struck down Florida's statute because "[a] jury's mere recommendation,"
even when the judge is required to give it "great weight," cannot satisfy
the Sixth Amendment.'95 Yet Alabama's statute does not even require the
judge to consider the jury's recommendation let alone give it great
weight. Rather, as Justice Stevens stated in his dissent in Harris I, Ala-
187. Id. at 487-89, 495-97 (Valihura, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
188. Id. at 495-96.
189. Id. (emphasis in original).
190. Bohannon v. State (In re Bohannon), No. 1150640, 2016 WL 5817692, at *17-18 (Ala.
Sept. 30, 2016).
191. See Waldrop v. State (In re Waldrop), 859 So. 2d 1181, 1194-95 (Ala. 2002). Similarly,
both Alabama and Florida's high courts held that the Supreme Court's rejection of judge-only death
sentencing in Ring was inapplicable to their own hybrid statutes. See Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d
693, 695 (Fla. 2002), abrogated by Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 620-21 (2016). In Bottoson, the
Florida Supreme Court denied the defendant's Ring challenge to his judicially-determined and
imposed death sentence, holding that the Supreme Court of the United States-by denying the de-
fendant's petition for certiorari, lifting his stay of execution without explanation, and not expressly
overruling Hildwin in Ring-effectively affirmed the sentence. Id. For the Alabama Supreme
Court's reconciliation of its hybrid scheme after Ring, see In re Waldrop, 859 So. 2d at 1185-88.
192. In re Bohannon, 2016 WL 5817692, at *14-15, *17-18.
193. Id. at * 14-15.
194. See Stevenson, supra note 9, at 1093.
195. See Hurstv. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 619-20 (2016).
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bama judges have "unbridled discretion to sentence the defendant to
death-even though a jury has determined that death is an inappropriate
penalty, and even though no basis exists for believing that any other rea-
sonable, properly instructed jury would impose a death sentence."'96
Hurst makes clear that such unbridled judicial discretion cannot meet the
Sixth Amendment's requirements to have a jury determine the facts
which make a defendant death eligible.'97
In addition, Alabama cannot successfully argue that stare decisis-
the Court's upholding of Alabama's death sentencing system in Harris
I-is dispositive. As the Court in Ring and Hurst rejected its previous
capital sentencing decisions in Walton, Spaziano, and Hildwin, here, the
Court would likely decide that Harris I is irreconcilable with the hold-
ings of Apprendi, Ring, and Hurst.198
The second difference involves Alabama's statutory division of cap-
ital crimes. On first glance, it appears that this difference provides some
ground upon which Alabama's law may rest, but this quickly disappears
after further examination. Writing before Hurst, then-Solicitor General of
Alabama Nathan Forrester argued that Alabama's law met the Court's
requirement in Ring that a jury must find an aggravating factor to make a
defendant eligible for death. 199 The state did so by dividing capital crimes
into eighteen separate offenses, most containing its own aggravating cir-
cumstance.200 In order for a jury to convict a defendant of a capital crime
in the trial's guilt-innocence stage, it must necessarily find the existence
of one of these aggravating factors.201 Therefore, before the judge moves
on to determine and impose the sentence, the jury has already found the
facts that make the defendant eligible, making the statute constitutionally
permissible.202 The Alabama Supreme Court used a similar rationale in
Waldrop v. State203 and Bohannon v. State204 when it twice upheld Ala-
bama's death sentencing system.205
196. Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 514-16 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
197. Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 619.
198. See id at 623; Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002).
199. Nathan A. Forrester, Judge Versus Jury: The Continuing Validity of Alabama's Capital
Sentencing Regime After Ring v. Arizona, 54 ALA. L. REv. 1157, 1158-59 (2003).
200. Id. at 1180-81 (e.g., murder during a kidnapping, murder during a robbery, and murder
during a rape).
201. Id. at 1197-98.
202. See id. at 1197-99.
203. 859 So. 2d 1181 (Ala. 2002).
204. No. 1150640, 2016 Ala. LEXIS 114 (Ala. Sept. 30, 2016), cert. denied, Bohannon v.
Alabama, 137 S. Ct. 831 (2017).
205. In re Bohannon, 2016 WL 5817692, at *15-16; In re Waldrop, 859 So. 2d at 1190-91.
This is not the first time in recent history that Alabama courts have defied federal court mandates on
the issues of Constitutional Law; elected Chief Justice Roy Moore of the Alabama Supreme Court
has once been removed from his office for defying a federal court order to remove a religious statue
which he installed in the Judicial Building in Montgomery, Alabama, home to that state's highest
court. Moore v. Judicial Inquiry Comm'n, 891 So. 2d 848, 850-52, 858, 862 (Ala. 2004). Even now
C.J. Moore has been suspended over his order to Alabama probate judges to defy the U.S. Supreme
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However, this argument ignores one crucial safeguard adopted by
every death penalty state after Gregg v. Georgia206: the bifurcated trial
system.207 Forrester and the Alabama Supreme Court effectively argue
the bifurcated trial system into a mere formality, one which may be easi-
ly circumvented by narrowly defining capital offenses.208 At the sentenc-
ing stage, the judge need not make any fact-finding necessary to impose
death because the findings have already been made.2 09 In simpler terms, a
conviction of a capital crime in Alabama makes a defendant eligible for
death.2 10
This is exactly the kind of formalism that Jones and Apprendi struck
down in non-capital sentencing, and it is exactly the kind of formalism
that Ring and Hurst make improper in death sentencing.211 In addition,
the mere finding of an aggravating circumstance-whether at the convic-
tion stage or sentencing stage-cannot make a defendant eligible for
death because Supreme Court precedent insists that the death penalty
requires a consideration of mitigating factors and a subsequent weighing
of those factors against aggravating circumstances.212
For these reasons, Ring and Hurst make it clear that the Alabama
capital sentencing scheme violates the Sixth Amendment because it al-
lows a judge to make an independent fact-finding necessary to make a
defendant eligible for the death penalty.213
In Bohannon, Alabama's highest court willfully ignored the United
States Supreme Court's signals in the months following Hurst that Ala-
bama's capital sentencing statute cannot stand; within a five-week peri-
od, the Court vacated three Alabama death sentences, remanding each
case to the state court for reevaluation in light of Hurst.214 By upholding
the Alabama statute in Bohannon and using reasoning that differs so
greatly from the Delaware court's holding in Rauf, Alabama's highest
Court's gay marriage ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges by denying marriage licenses to same-sex
couples. Kyle Whitmire, Roy Moore Suspended from Office: Alabama ChiefJustice Faces Removal
over Gay Marriage Stance, AL.COM,
http://www.al.com/news/index.ssf/2016/05/alabamachiefjustice roymoor_10.html (last updated
May 8, 2016, 6:35 PM).
206. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion).
207. See Abramson, supra note 12, at 151-52.
208. Id
209. See id at 150-51.
210. Cf Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 271 (1976) (describing how a death penalty system that
does not allow the sentencing body to consider mitigating circumstances would violate the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments).
211. See supra notes 57-59, 65-69 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
213. See Stevenson, supra note 9, at 1120.
214. Kirksey v. Alabama, 136 S. Ct. 2409, 2409 (2016) (mem.); Wimbley v. Alabama, 136 S.
Ct. 2387, 2387 (2016) (mem.); Johnson v. Alabama, 136 S. Ct. 1837, 1837 (2016) (mem.).
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court has essentially guaranteed that litigants will petition for Supreme
Court review.215
Crucially, the makeup of the Court is now in flux with the death of
Justice Antonin Scalia in February 2016.216 justice Scalia was a forceful
advocate for limiting Ring to fact-findings of aggravating factors.2 17
Without Justice Scalia's presence, Justice Sotomayor, who authored the
majority opinion of Hurst, has a greater opportunity to persuade a ma-
jority of justices to explicitly and clearly recognize that the Sixth
Amendment requires a jury to make all findings necessary to impose a
sentence of death, including the finding of mitigating circumstances and
the process of weighing mitigating circumstances against aggravating
218circumstances.
D. The Death Penalty Should Be Hard: Combining the Sixth and Eighth
Amendments
Death is different.2 19 State-sanctioned killing as punishment is final,
irreversible, and extraordinarily severe.220 The death penalty is not only
exceptional for defendants, but also has broader societal implications as
well because "the action of the sovereign in taking the life of one of its
citizens . . . differs dramatically from any other legitimate state ac-
tion." 2 21 Death requires more justification than other punishments: "It is
of vital importance to the defendant and to the community that any deci-
sion to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason
rather than caprice or emotion."222
Similarly, the punitive justifications for the death penalty differ
from those of lesser punishments.2 23 Death does not effectively deter
215. Three litigants have already petitioned for certiorari, but the Supreme Court declined to
hear these cases without explanation. Richard Wolf, Supreme Court Lets Alabama Judges Impose
Death Penalty, USA TODAY (Jan. 23, 2017, 12:18 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/01/23/supreme-court-alabama-florida-death-
penalty-judge-jury/96947280/.
216. Adam Liptak, Antonin Scalia, Justice on the Supreme Court, Dies at 79, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
13, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/antonin-scalia-death.html.
217. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 611-13 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring).
218. See Woodward v. Alabama, 143 S. Ct. 405, 410-11 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari); see also supra notes 184-86 (discussing Delaware Supreme Court Justice
Holland's interpretation of Hurst wherein he reasons that Justice Sotomayor has already made this
requirement plain in Hurst).
219. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 290 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (per
curiam) ("[T]he finality of death precludes relief"); id at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("[The death
penalty] is unique in its total irrevocability."). For a discussion of "death-is-different" philosophy
and jurisprudence, see Abramson, supra note 12, at 124-28.
220. See, e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986) ("[E]xecution is the most irreme-
diable and unfathomable of penalties ... . [D]eath is different."); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625,
637 (1980) ("[D]eath is a different kind of punishment from any other which may be imposed in this
country . . .." (alteration in original) (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 (1977))).
221. Gardner, 430 U.S. at 357-58.
222. See id at 358.
223. See Abramson, supra note 12, at 119 ("[R]etribution provides the main justification for
capital punishment." (quoting Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 614 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring))).
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crime, does not significantly incapacitate criminals more than life with-
out parole, and, of course, cannot rehabilitate. Instead, the death penal-
ty's primary justification is retribution.224 Reinstating the death penalty in
Gregg after Furman's four-year moratorium, the Supreme Court recog-
nized the retributive nature of the death penalty: "[capital punishment] is
an expression of the community's belief that certain crimes are them-
selves so grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate response
may be the penalty of death."225
Retribution requires more than these other justifications. Justice
Breyer has argued that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment demands that such retributive punishment be decid-
ed and imposed by juries because juries "are more likely to 'express the
conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death,'
and [are] better able to determine in the particular case the need for retri-
bution .... "226
In recent years, the Sixth Amendment has been an important tool
for reforming the death penalty. However, the limits placed on the
Amendment by the Court227 indicate that standing alone it may not be
sufficient to protect capital defendants from state overreach. It was under
the Eighth Amendment that he Court launched modem capital punish-
ment jurisprudence as states responded to Furman's critiques.228 It was in
the Eighth Amendment that the Court found and imposed many constitu-
tional limits for the death penalty: a death sentence must not be arbitrary
or random, and the punishment of death must not be grossly dispropor-
tionate to the severity of the crime.229 Eighth Amendment capital juris-
prudence should similarly be brought to bear to protect a criminal de-
230
fendant from being sentenced to death by a judge's determination.
224. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 614-16; see also Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 517-18 (1995)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 477-81 (1984) (Stevens, Brennan &
Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part), overruled by Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616
(2016); cf Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("The death penalty is
said to serve two principal social purposes: retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospec-
tive offenders.").
225. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 184, 207.
226. Ring, 536 U.S. at 614-16 (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968))
(further citation omitted).
227. See discussion supra Section III.A.
228. Kamin & Marceau, supra note 9, at 534-35.
229. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding that he death penalty may
not be imposed on intellectually disabled criminal defendants); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782,
797-98 (1982) (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits death for aiders and abettors of a
felony murder); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597-600 (1977) (holding that the death penalty is
disproportionate punishment for rape); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plu-
rality opinion) (holding that the death penalty may not be the mandatory punishment for violating a
criminal statute).
230. See Bowers et al., supra note 13, at 1003; Kamin & Marceau, supra note 9, at 586 ("The
Court should take up the call of Justices Breyer and Stevens and hold that the Eighth Amendment
requires that juries determine the ultimate sentence...."); Stevenson, supra note 9, at 1152 (dis-
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The Constitution uses broad language, cruel and unusual, to de-
scribe the Eighth Amendment's punitive prohibitions.23 1 The Supreme
Court has stated time and again that what constitutes "cruel and unusual"
232cannot be fixed or static. Rather, courts must look to "'the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society' to
determine which punishments are .. . cruel and unusual."233 In turn, the
Court derived "two essential touchstones for defining the evolving stand-
ards of decency that are at the core of the Eighth Amendment's prohibi-
tion against cruel and unusual punishments: (1) objective ind[ices] of
contemporary values" seen in death penalty legislation and jury verdicts
"and (2) ... whether the death penalty comports with the basic concept
of human dignity at the core of the Amendment."234
Although the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee almost surely
prohibits Alabama's judicial override,235 the Alabama statute also runs
afoul of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual pun-
ishment. The statute cannot withstand the two-part test that the Supreme
Court has set forth for evaluating the evolving standards of decency that
delineate constitutional punishments from cruel and unusual ones.236
On the national scale, American opposition to capital punishment is
at its highest point since Furman.237 After Ring and Hurst, Alabama now
stands alone as the only state with a complete judicial override.238 In oth-
er words, there is a national consensus against judicial override. The Su-
preme Court has regularly found a national consensus against forms of
the death penalty on much less objective indicia than this.239 For exam-
cussing how the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence already includes the right to a capital jury
in sentencing decisions and that this right should be preserved).
231. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
232. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560-61 (2005).
233. See id. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958)).
234. Stevenson, supra note 9, at 1139 (alteration in original) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 181-82 (1976) (plurality opinion)); see also Roper, 543 U.S. at 563-64; Atkins, 536 U.S.
at 311-12.
235. See discussion supra Section III.C.
236. See, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 ("[T]he 'clearest and most reliable objective evidence of
contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country's legislatures."' (quoting Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989), abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002))); Coker
v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592-97 (1977) (discussing jury determinations and legislation for evaluat-
ing death penalty as the punishment for the crime of rape under Eighth Amendment).
237. See Niraj Chokshi, Death Penalty Loses Majority Support for First Time in 45 Years,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/04/us/death-penalty-loses-majority-
support-for-first-time-in-45-years.html (discussing the findings of a Pew Research Center survey of
Americans between August and September 2016).
238. Alabama's sole companion, Delaware, recently overturned its own judicial override
statute. See Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d 430, 433-35 (Del. 2016) (per curiam); see also discussion supra
Section III.B. Florida's legislature replaced the judicial override with jury sentencing in light of
Hurst. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2), (3) (2016) ("If the jury has recommended a sentence of:... Life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole, the court shall impose the recommended sentence."),
held unconstitutional by Perry v. State, No. SC16-547, 2016 WL 6036982 (Fla. Oct. 14, 2016) (per
curiam).
239. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 564; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313-15.
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ple, the Court found a national consensus against the death penalty for
240
juveniles when thirty states prohibited the execution of children.
Likewise only twenty-one states prohibited the death penalty for the in-
tellectually disabled when the Supreme Court found a national consensus
against that form of punishment.24'
Even before Alabama became the only state with a judicial override
statute, it stood out among its peers as the only state to regularly disre-
gard the entire purpose of the judicial override. 242 Instead of granting
judges the power to quell too-punitive juries-likely the result of strong
emotions among jury members-by overriding death sentences with life,
243
Alabama judges have routinely done the exact opposite. Between
1976's reinstatement of the death penalty and 2011, Alabama judges
overrode the jury 107 times.2 44 In 98 cases-almost 92% of the time-
the judge ignored the jury's mercy and imposed death.245 In startling con-
trast, the judge only granted a more merciful sentence than the jury in 9
of those cases-barely 8% of the time.
246
The second part of the Eighth Amendment test consists of the jus-
tice's own judgment.247 The Supreme Court has held that "in cases in-
volving a consensus [such as in the case of judicial overrides], our own
judgment is 'brought to bear,' by asking whether there is reason to disa-
gree with the judgment reached by the citizenry and its legislators."248 In
Atkins v. Virginia, in which the Court held that the Eighth Amendment
barred death sentences for intellectually disabled defendants, the justices'
own judgment found no such disagreement, finding that "the execution
of [intellectually disabled] criminals will [not] measurably advance the
deterrent or the retributive purpose of the death penalty."249
Bringing their own judgment to bear, judges should be troubled by
another aspect of judicial imposition of the death penalty: the effect of
political pressure on the judiciary in a tough-on-crime nation.250 While
better qualified to understand and apply the law, a judge is a single state
actor, and many judges are subject to political pressure which should
240. Roper, 543 U.S. at 564.
241. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313-15.
242. See EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN ALABAMA: JUDGE OVERRIDE 9-
13 (2011) (discussing how Delaware and Florida only rarely used the judicial override and more
often than not the judge overrode the jury's decision of death to impose life instead).




247. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313 (2002).
248. Id. (citation omitted).
249. Id at 321.
250. Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 519-20 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Alabama trial
judges face partisan election every six years. The danger that they will bend to political pressures
when pronouncing sentence in highly publicized capital cases is the same danger confronted by
judges beholden to King George Ill." (citation omitted)).
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have no place in determining individual capital sentences.251 Former
Chief Justice Rose Bird of the California Supreme Court represents the
danger of such political pressure to judges. 52 After overturning every
death penalty case she heard on the court, her political opponents ran a
successful campaign against her retention on the court based in large part
on these death penalty rulings.253 At the same time, the state's governor
threatened and ultimately opposed another two justices, whom he
254
thought did not uphold enough death penalty cases. After filling their
seats with new justices, California's highest court dramatically shifted to
upholding nearly 97% of death penalty cases thereafter.
2 55
These political pressures affect trial judges as well. A study of Ala-
bama's judicial override by the Equal Justice Initiative revealed that
"30% of death sentences were imposed by [judicial] override" in 2008,
compared to "just 7% in 1997."256 A key difference between these two
years is that 2008 was an election year and 1997 was not.257 The combi-
nation of tough-on-crime judges and a judicial override capital sentenc-
ing regime has led to disturbing results in Alabama, a practical reversal
of the merciful purpose of judicial override.258
Although she authored the majority opinion in Harris I,259 which
260upheld Alabama's judicial override in 1995, Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor has long led the push to end the election of judges, arguing
that "[i]n many states" they are merely "politicians in robes."261 justice
Stevens, in his Harris I dissent, gave a thorough and powerful argument
for why judges should not be the ultimate capital sentencing authority.26 2
He cited the United States' long history of requiring a jury to pass a sen-
tence of death, the fact that judges "are far more likely than juries to im-
pose the death penalty" due to political pressure, and that the judicial
251. See Bowers et al., supra note 13, at 989-91, for a discussion of the political pressures on
elected judges in hybrid states with regard to reviewing and passing capital sentences.
252. Maura Dolan, Ex-Chief Justice Rose Bird Dies of Cancer at 63, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 5,
1999), http://articles.latimes.com/1999/dec/05/news/mn-40743; Todd S. Purdum, Rose Bird, Once
California's Chief Justice, Is Dead at 63, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 1999),
http://www.nytimes.com/1 999/12/06/us/rose-bird-once-califomia-s-chief-justice-is-dead-at-63.html.
253. See Dolan, supra note 252; Purdum, supra note 252.
254. Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding Be-
tween the Bill ofRights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759, 760-61 (1995).
255. Id.
256. See EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 242, at 8.
257. Id.
258. See supra notes 213-15 and accompanying text; see also Woodward v. Alabama, 134 S.
Ct. 405, 408 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) ("Alabama judges, who are
elected in partisan proceedings, appear to have succumbed to electoral pressures.").
259. 513 U.S. 504 (1995).
260. Id. at 515.
261. Annemarie Mannion, Retired Justice Warns Against "Politicians in Robes," CHI. TRIB.
(May 30, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-05-30/news/chi-retired-justice-wams-
against-politicians-in-robes-201305301 o-connor-bias-judges.
262. Harris, 513 U.S. at 516-26 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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override in particular undermines the jury's role, responsibility, and le-
gitimacy.263
Improper political pressure is not the only problem with the judicial
override from life to death. In Alabama, judicial override "is character-
ized by arbitrariness and error.,264 Whether or not a defendant is subject
to judicial override seems largely dependent on the county in which the
defendant is convicted.265 Errors have led to reversal of sentences or con-
victions for a startling number (37%) of those sentenced by life-to-death
override.266
Given the Alabama legislature's history of refusing to comply with
federal court orders,267 the legislature-and perhaps even the judiciary-
will likely not overturn the law without a clear federal court mandate and
perhaps not even then. The Supreme Court should force hesitant states
such as Alabama to recognize constitutional requirements by declaring
that it is the role of a jury to serve as the community's representative and
268voice in the administration of criminal defense. Since the death penalty
is the ultimate punishment and has its own unique requirements, it should
263. Id. at 516-23; see also Stephen B. Bright, Political Attacks on the Judiciary: Can Justice
Be Done Amid Efforts to Intimidate and Remove Judges from Office for Unpopular Decisions?, 72
N.Y.U. L. REv. 308, 330 (1997) (discussing how Justice Stevens has stated that "[a] campaign
promise to 'be tough on crime,' or to 'enforce the death penalty,' is evidence of bias that should
disqualify a candidate from sitting in criminal cases" (alteration in original) (quoting Justice John
Paul Stevens, Opening Assembly Address at the American Bar Association Annual Meeting (Aug. 3,
1996))). Political pressure on judges due to single, unpopular decisions has been in the news again
recently. In California, Judge Aaron Persky outraged many in the country when he gave a Stanford
athlete, Brock Turner, a mere six-month jail sentence for raping an unconscious woman; this deci-
sion has led to a petition to remove Persky from his position on the bench, the support for which
"swelled to over 1.2 million signatures[] . , . ." Christine Hauser, Judge in Stanford Sexual Assault
Trial Will No Longer Hear Criminal Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/27/us/judge-in-stanford-sexual-assault-trial-will-no-longer-hear-
criminal-cases.html. As of August 26, 2016, Judge Persky has requested and been granted a transfer
to a civil docket. Id. In Colorado, an online petition to remove Boulder District Judge Patrick Butler
garnered thousands of supporters after Butler sentenced a University of Colorado student o proba-
tion and work release for raping an unconscious woman. Boulder Daily Camera, Petition Seeks
Recall of Judge in Austin Wilkerson Case, but Judges Can't Be Recalled in Colorado, DENV. POST
(Aug. 12, 2016, 2:08 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/2016/08/12/colorado-petition-recall-judge-
austin-wilkerson-case.
264. EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 242, at 17.
265. See id ("Just three of Alabama's 67 counties account or nearly half of the life-to-death
overrides statewide. ... Mobile and Montgomery's override rates are higher even than their overall
death sentencing rates.").
266. Id. at 22.
267. See discussion supra Section III.C.205
268. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 498 (2000) (Scalia,
J., concurring) ("The founders of the American Republic were not prepared to leave [the criminal
justice system] to the State, which is why the jury-trial guarantee was one of the least controversial
provisions of the Bill of Rights."); see also Bowers et al., supra note 13, at 962-63, 971-72 (discuss-
ing empirical evidence showing that, in hybrid states, a judge's ultimate sentencing responsibility
leads to juries being more likely to feel less responsible for sentencing and being more likely to
misunderstand sentencing instructions).
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be the jury's role to determine, impose, and take responsibility for each
death sentence.269
Going forward, the Supreme Court should recognize this capital
sentencing limitation as required by both the Sixth and Eighth Amend-
ments. These Amendments, standing together, will serve as twin bul-
warks against the unjust administration of death, reminding state legisla-
tures, courts, and juries that death is different and the death penalty
should be hard to impose and carry out.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Court should recognize the Sixth and Eighth
Amendments as twin guarantees that a jury pass the sentence of death in
every particular case. This can be achieved by using the Apprendi, Ring,
and Hurst decisions to require that a jury make all fact-finding determi-
nations required to make a defendant death eligible, including finding
mitigating circumstances and the subsequent weighing determination. In
addition, the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment
requires the jury, reflecting and expressing the "conscience of the com-
munity," to determine and impose a sentence of death-it would be im-
proper for a trial judge, a state actor, to impose the ultimate penalty. Each
of these Amendments might suffice by itself, but taken together, they can
ensure that he death penalty, should a state employ it, undergo the most
rigorous constitutional review.
Jeffrey Wermer
269. See Bowers et al., supra note 13, at 1006 ("The law should not subject judges to undue
pressures to compromise judicial neutrality, especially not when it also weakens jurors' conscien-
tiousness and sense of responsibility and even more so when the defendant's life is at stake.").
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